Private browser chat without a permanent inbox.

Orylin starts from a deliberately small product model: create a temporary invitation, bring one peer into the same session, communicate, and let the session expire or be ended. Accounts, contact discovery and server-side conversation history are not the centre of the design.

The smaller lifecycle makes important state visible. Invitation age, peer authentication, directness and expiry are product concepts rather than invisible infrastructure details.

The system prefers a verified direct WebRTC path. If that path is unavailable, an explicitly labelled volunteer-browser ciphertext relay may support bounded messaging or file traffic, while the current rescue path is message-only.

Direct, relay and rescue are not synonyms. The interface needs to show which path is active because the path changes latency, availability and the trust story the user is relying on.

The current runtime uses invitation-bound material to bootstrap an encrypted application channel with directional AES-GCM keys, counters and replay rejection. The Cloudflare edge coordinates sessions but is not intended to become a conversation mailbox or payload store.

That is a concrete current-product boundary. Future post-quantum and media-security designs remain candidate work until their own providers, vectors, browser paths and review gates are complete.

A privacy product is easier to trust when it says exactly which runtime is being described. Current messaging, bounded file transfer and Direct-only voice are separate from future PQ profiles and from stronger claims about anonymity or traffic analysis.

The engineering lesson is simple: do not let a roadmap diagram silently become a production guarantee.